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Horseshoes and Hand Grenades: Frank v. 





Frank v. Gaos is a case that weighed the merits of cy pres, 
a pesky complex doctrine left applied to my dismay. 
When in class action settlements, there are remaining funds, 
Defendants seem to benefit from what the Plaintiffs won. 
 
Worse still the doctrine is applied in cases such as this; 
when direct payments to a class are deemed de minimus. 
Counsel decided class members were fine with what they got, 
Then phoned their favorite charities to divvy the whole pot. 
 
Once courts agree that’s close enough to benefit the class, 
They seem to turn a blind eye to what’s really come to pass: 
Although there are alternatives, which objectors have implored, 
The cash goes to a charity (Defendant’s on the Board). 
 
I hope to use this note to criticize the cy pres doctrine. 
I’ll lay out some alternatives to find a better option. 
Quand cherchent justice il n’y a chose plus horrible 
Que dire que on vas arriver cy pres comme possible. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Have you ever been a member of a class action claim? If you are a 
consumer in the United States then the answer is probably yes, whether 
you knew about the lawsuit or not. For example, you may have been a 
member in the price-fixing class action against Fresh Milk. The class 
involved in that lawsuit, which settled for $52 million, was everyone 
who bought dairy products in 15 states and the District of Colombia at 
any point between 2003 and January of 2017.1  
Even if youre lactose intolerant, there are plenty of other classes of 
which you may have been a part. It seems reasonable to guess that 
anyone reading this has studied some amount of Civil Procedure, and 
therefore has some familiarity with Asahi, the landmark case in which a 
California court was allowed jurisdiction over a Japanese company based 
on the presence of their goods in the “stream of commerce.”2 You may 
have also realized that Asahi is coincidentally also a brand of beer. If you 
happen to have purchased an Asahi beer some time between April 5, 
2013 and December 20, 2018, then you have until May 3, 2019 to claim 
 
1  The 15 states were Arizona, California, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Carlin v. DairyAmerica, Inc., 328 F.R.D 393 (9th Cir. 
2018). 
2  See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
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your share of their recent class action settlement related to truth in 
advertising.3  
In each of these examples, many class members ultimately failed to 
claim their shares of settlements or judgments rendered in their favor. 
Most of these lawsuits feature class members that never even become 
aware of their rights regarding claims.4 This has created a dynamic where 
“[i]n virtually every class action, there remains a reserve fund after all 
claims and expenses have been paid.”'5 That remaining fund often 
amounts to millions of dollars. Seeking a solution for all of this leftover 
money in class action cases, Federal Courts did what they do best: they 
complicated things with French.6 For this particular problem set, Federal 
Courts have been applying a doctrine called cy pres comme possible (cy 
pres for short), which is a Norman French concept that had already 
 
3  Asahi took advantage of its Japanese name, allowing its products seem imported 
rather than domestic despite the fact that they were brewed and bottled in California. See 
Shalikar v. Asahi Beer U.S.A, Inc., No. LA CV17-02713 JAK, 2017 WL 9362139 (C.D. 
Cal. Oct. 16, 2017); Marc Sorini, Ruling in the Asahi Beer Class Action, LEXOLOGY 
(Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=fd21f9d2-f6e2-4a03-
9358-e238c3c2f136. 
4  “Recent class action settlements have exceeded $10 billion. More than half of those 
entitled to receive payment never even file a claim – because they are unaware of the 
lawsuit, or don’t know how to proceed.” National Unclaimed Property Associates, Class 
Action Lawsuit Settlement Search, UNCLAIMED, https://unclaimed.com/class-action-
lawsuit-settlement-search/. 
5  In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 557 F. Supp. 1091, 1104 (N.D. Ill. 1983), 
aff'd, 744 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985). 
6  Britt Hanson, A (Mostly) Succinct History of English Legal Language, Ariz. Att'y, 
July/August 2012, at 29-30. 
For a lawsuit, we need a court, which means we need a courthouse, a 
judge and a government that pays for these--let's say it's a county. 
We'd get nowhere without a plaintiff and a defendant, collectively 
known as the parties. [. . .] 
Rules of procedure ensure that the lawsuit proceeds in an orderly 
fashion. Eventually there will be motions, briefs and other pleadings. 
Lawyers (and attorneys!) will present arguments at hearings, which 
will be attended by a bailiff, clerk and court reporter. The judge will 
issue an opinion. 
[. . .] To err is human, so we better provide for an appeal. In the end, 
we hope justice is done. 
So, what are the origins of all these words of a lawsuit? 
As mentioned, law is from Old Norse. Bench, witness, oath, the 
house in courthouse, and the swear in answer derive from Old 
English. Only two of these words—testify and clerk—are from Latin. 
This leaves the vast majority of words. Where did these come from? 
French! 
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become prevalent in trust law.7 The doctrine translates to “as near as 
possible,” and has been used to achieve the objectives of a charitable 
trust in situations where its original goals are otherwise impossible.8 In 
the context of trusts, cy pres has even been used to allow courts to rectify 
oversights in sloppy trust drafting to ensure that the objectives of the 
testator are met.9  
Successful applications of cy pres doctrine in trust law seem to have 
tempted federal courts to import this concept to class actions, and use it 
to justify distribution of funds to charities that are deemed to accomplish 
the goals of the litigation.10 Proponents of applying cy pres doctrine in 
class action lawsuits argue that this is an adequate, and even 
commendable, solution to the massive stores of undistributed money 
remaining from these types of lawsuits.11 They argue that charities are 
well-equipped to accomplish the goals of particular lawsuits, and that 
class members receive sufficient benefits from monies being sent to 
organizations that were uninvolved in the litigation.12  
Class actions have a good deal in common with trusts conceptually, 
so there is some logic in applying a bespoke trust doctrine to class 
actions.13 However, “a trust model of the class action suggests that cy 
pres awards to a private third party like a charity may, in many 
circumstances, be inappropriate in the class action context because of the 
harmful effects they may have on deterrence and compensation.”14 
Although proponents of the doctrine have lauded cy pres as the saving 
grace of modern class actions, these distributions ultimately seem to run 
afoul of several requirements outlined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23—the rule that governs class action procedure.15  
 
7  See e.g. Kolb v. City of Storm Lake, 736 N.W. 2d 546, 546-50 (Iowa 2007); Am. 
Jur. 2d, Charities §§ 157 et seq. 
8  Id. 
9  See e.g. Gallaudet University v. National Soc. of the Daughters of the American 
Revolution, 699 A.2d 531, 533-35 (Md. App. 1997) (in which the court allowed extrinsic 
evidence of testator intent to divert a divestment to a charity using the cy pres doctrine). 
10  See e.g. Natalie DeJarlais, The Consumer Trust Fund: A Cy Pres Solution to 
Undistributed Funds in Consumer Class Actions, 38 HASTINGS L. J. 729, 729-50 (1987); 
The Cy Pres Solution to the Damage Distribution Problems of Mass Class Actions, 9 GA. 
L. REV. 893, 915 (1975). 
11  Id. 
12  Id. 
13  See generally Sergio J. Campos, The Class Action As Trust, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1461 
(2016). 
14  Id. at 1521-1522. 
15  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
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In the first section of this note, I will address the concerns that Rule 
23 raises over cy pres distributions and discuss whether the doctrine is 
compatible with the fundamental goals of class action lawsuits. I will 
also present several empirical findings about cy pres distributions in class 
actions to show trends among applications of this doctrine. Next, I will 
discuss the two instances in which the issue of class action cy pres has 
been considered, and subsequently left undecided, by the Supreme Court 
of the United States. Then, I will evaluate the rules that govern the actual 
recipients of cy pres distributions, charities, to better understand the end 
results of these distributions. Finally, before offering my conclusions, I 
will present alternative uses for undistributed funds in class actions to 
challenge whether cy pres really means “as near as possible.”  
II. THE PROBLEM OF CY PRES IN MODERN CLASS ACTIONS 
Cy pres distributions have been successful in trust law because the 
goals of a charitable trust are often ascertainable.16 Identifying the 
concrete goals of a particular class action, or class actions as a whole, is 
often a bit more complex. Some of the major goals that scholars tend to 
identify for class actions include compensation for harmed individuals 
and deterrent effects on wrongdoing defendants.17 Cy pres distributions 
fail with respect to each of those goals. Rule 23 provides the mechanism 
for bringing class action claims, including requirements dictating the 
manner in which attorneys and judges must behave in those cases.18 
Those requirements also go awry with many class action cy pres 
distributions.  
When funds from a class action are distributed using a cy pres 
scheme, none of those funds provide direct benefits to the plaintiff class 
members. In cy pres-only distributions, unnamed class members get no 
direct compensation whatsoever from the resolution of their claims. 
Proponents of cy pres in class actions argue that this only happens in two 
instances: when funds go unclaimed,19 or when direct payment to class 
 
16  See e.g. A. W. Scott & W. F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 399 (4th ed. 1987) 
(describing the historic rise of cy pres applications in redistributing funds from charitable 
trusts in the United States). 
17  See e.g. Deborah R. Hensler, Happy 50th Anniversary, Rule 23! Shouldn’t We Know 
You Better After All This Time?, 156 PENN. L. REV. 1599, 1611-15 (Jun. 2017); David 
Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class 
Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1872-88 (2002). 
18  See e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. (a)(4), (e)(2), (g)(2), (g)(4).  
19  See Dejarlais, supra note 11, at 730.  
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members would be de minimus after administrative costs of 
distribution.20  
In the former instance, there usually is some compensation for class 
members. It does not, however, provide any good reason for the 
redistribution of remaining funds to cy pres recipients. Advocates of cy 
pres distributions in this category argue that these remaining funds are of 
little concern because many are small percentages of the total awards or 
settlements.21 These arguments brush by the fact that a low-percentage 
distribution from a large fund can still be a hefty sum of money.22 The 
recipients of these distributions were not involved in the underlying class 
action, and they have no accountability to compensate or benefit the 
actual class members.23  
The latter instance includes cases where cy pres distributions are 
incorporated into settlements and judgements irrespective of whether the 
funds may go unclaimed. In this category, cy pres distributions are taken 
from a designated amount of the funds paid by the defendant, which can 
be the entire award after fees and costs.24 Relative to the first, this 
category is a more unabashed way to distribute lawsuit funds to 
uninvolved parties, and critics of class action cy pres should feel more 
concerned with this type of application. Unfortunately, this is the faster-
growing method for cy pres distributions in class actions.25 When it 
comes to the goal of compensating harmed class members, sending class 
action funds to uninvolved cy pres recipients goes no further than having 
those funds escheat to the state.26 Indeed, gathering the funds into a pile 
and setting them ablaze would compensate class members to the same 
degree as a cy pres distribution to a third party.  
 
20  Id. at 732-38. 
21  See e.g. Brief of Professor William B. Rubenstein as Amicus Curiae, p. 6-8; 11; 79, 
see Frank v. Gaos,  139 S. Ct. 1041 (2019) (urging the Supreme Court to approve a total 
cy pres distribution because such distributions are “exceedingly rare,” while ignoring the 
majority of class action cy pres awards, which account for less than 75% of the total 
funds from their respective lawsuits). 
22  West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 722-23, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971) (where a $32 
million cy pres distribution was taken out of a $100 million settlement—or only 32% of 
the total settlement).  
23  See infra Part III. 
24  See e.g. Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1043-48 (2019). 
25  See infra Part II (a). 
26  Like cy pres recipients, the state was likely uninvolved in the underlying class 
action. However, escheating the funds to the state could actually have a beneficial effect 
on the class members who live there. See infra Part IV (c).  
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Turning to deterrence, cy pres distributions have also undermined 
this critical goal of class action lawsuits. This happens because the 
defendants in these cases can have relationships with the organizations 
that ultimately receive cy pres distributions from settlements or 
judgements entered against them.  The cy pres recipients could be huge 
sources of revenue for the defendants,27 and conceivably return the funds 
to the wrongdoers through added business. The cy pres recipients could 
even have board members selected by the defendants.28 When defendants 
can get returns from adverse class actions, they enjoy reduced financial 
strain from the lawsuits. This in turn prevents defendants from fully 
feeling the deterrent effects that these class actions should be 
promulgating. 
Rule 23 outlines duties for attorneys who seek to achieve these goals 
in any given class action.29 This is particularly true in cases resolved by 
settlements because unnamed class members have fewer opportunities to 
challenge decisions that their lawyers and class representatives have 
made on their behalf.30 If the unnamed plaintiffs’ individual claims are 
considered, especially in massive class action lawsuits, then it is difficult 
to see how class council could agree with schemes that do not provide 
any benefit to those class members at all.  
The rationale that class counsel follows, when going along with these 
schemes, becomes a bit easier to understand when considering the 
incentives of the involved attorneys themselves. Class counsel often 
stands to realize personal gain through cy pres distributions, which they 
would not have gotten had the monetary award been directly distributed 
to class members.31 Cy pres schemes have little to no impact on the 
amounts that attorneys receive in fees and costs for representing a class, 
despite the fact that those fees are often supposed to be directly 
proportional to class compensation.32  
 
27  See infra note 59. 
28  See e.g. Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012) (where Facebook was 
allowed to choose one of three board members for the recipient cy pres foundation). 
29  See Fed. R. Civ. P. R. 23 (g). 
30  Id. at (e)(2). 
31  For example, some cy pres distributions can be likened to glorified alumni 
fundraisers, with awards going to universities that class counsel had attended. See infra 
note 59.   
32  See e.g. In re Heartland Payment Systems, Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Lit., 851 
F.Supp. 2d 1040, 1069-1080 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (holding that funds distributed in a class 
action cy pres award should not be considered as compensation to class members for the 
purposes of determining counsel compensation); but see Lane v. Facebook, Inc., supra 
note 31 (where a cy pres-only award was used to justify proportional class 
compensation). 
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 In the case of class action settlements, judges presiding over these 
cases also have added duties concerning approving or rejecting 
proposals. As with the rule for the attorneys, these requirements are 
intended to protect unnamed class members from being strung along by 
attorneys with a pecuniary interest. In the case of judges, this end is 
achieved by instructing the judge to consider individual class member 
interests, rather than the interests of the class as a whole, when deciding 
questions of law in class action cases.33 Regarding settlements, Rule 23 
also requires these judges presiding to hold hearings to establish whether 
class action settlements are fair, reasonable, and adequate.34 These 
determinations must be made after considering the adequacy of  class 
representation, whether the settlement was negotiated at arms-length, and 
the adequacy of the relief provided to the class members.35  
A. Cy Pres by the Numbers 
Cy pres distributions are a growing feature of class action 
judgements and settlements. Meanwhile, very little scholarly work has 
been written to criticize the increasing use of this distribution scheme. 
One of these works, which provided in-depth empirical analysis about 
recent cy pres class action distributions, described many of its findings as 
the “pathologies” of the doctrine.36 In that article, the authors provided 
many comprehensive data points that highlighted financial effects of cy 
pres distributions, and the types of class actions that most featured 
applications of the doctrine.37 The following section seeks to update 
many of the empirical findings in that article, and provide additional 
observations for those data points. There are several “Pathologies” 
described in the article that were omitted in the interest of brevity.38 
Although omitted, those figures provide additional insight to the side 
effects of cy pres distributions. Indeed, updates to the omitted data could 
very well be the subject of future works criticizing this doctrine in class 
actions.  
 
33  See Fed. R. Civ. P. R. 23 at (b)(3)(A). 
34  Id. at (e)(2). 
35  Id. 
36  Redish, Julian, & Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class 
Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L.REV. 617, 653–56 (2010). 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
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i. Pathologies Findings 
The authors and research assistants behind Cy Pres Relief and the 
Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical 
Analysis put together a comprehensive analysis of 120 class action cases 
that featured cy pres distributions, which took place between 1974 and 
2008.39 To that end, the authors offered the following summaries of their 
findings: 
First, the prevalence of class action cy pres awards has 
increased steadily by decade since the 1980s and has 
accelerated noticeably after 2000. Second, since 2000, 
the majority of class action cy pres awards are associated 
with cases that were certified solely for the purposes of 
settlement, over one-third of class action cy pres awards 
are associated with faux class actions, and approximately 
two-thirds of class action cy pres awards are associated 
with either settlement or faux class actions. Third, in a 
quarter of cy pres class actions, the amount and recipient 
of the cy pres award was determined ex ante, or prior to 
giving absent class members the opportunity to make 
claims on the fund. Fourth, the average cy pres award 
was $5.8 million and accounted on average for 30.8% of 
total compensatory damages. Finally, not only do cy pres 
awards have the potential to increase the total available 
fund and legitimize cases where the class might not 
otherwise be certified, but they can also increase the 
likelihood and absolute amount of attorneys' fees 
awarded without directly, or even indirectly, benefiting 
the plaintiff.40 
The authors based their findings on a series of searches that were 
performed using Westlaw, Lexis Nexis, and Google.41 The following 
graphs were used to present data in support of their first, second, and 
fourth conclusions:  
 
39  Id. at 659-61. 
40  Redish, Julian, & Zyontz, supra note 39, at 661. 
41  Id.  
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As shown by the chart, the popularity of cy pres awards in class 
actions climbed at a staggering rate between 1990 and 2008. The number 
of cy pres awards that came from settlements, instead of judgements, 
also grew during that time. The authors also noted that the doctrine was  
not adequately challenged, or even criticized, during this time. 
This table was produced with a smaller sample of the overall search. 
Specifically, the authors used a group of 47 cases that had available 
award breakdowns. Several observations can be taken from this table. 
First, although the average cy pres award was 30.8%, the average amount 
distributed in cy pres was still nearly 6 million dollars. Furthermore, the 
42 Id. (Although the content of the graph is the same, the style has been adjusted to 
conform with other data illustrations in this note.) 
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standard deviation of almost 15 million dollars indicates a wild range in 
amounts among those measured. That figure suggests that half of the cy 
pres awards measured fell between $342 and $20,345,54343, with the 
remaining half being even higher cy pres awards. The authors further 
analyzed these awards by showing them as percentages of total 
compensatory damages for each case. In doing so, they highlighted the 
existence of cases in which all compensatory damages were being 
distributed through some sort of cy pres scheme. 
Ultimately, this empirical analysis and critique of cy pres awards in 
class actions finally prompted the Supreme Court to pay attention to this 
trend in modern class actions.44 
ii. Updates to Cy Pres 
Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action 
concluded with the sentiment that class action cy pres “must therefore be 
abandoned by the federal courts.”45  Nearly a decade later, the doctrine is 
still alive and well in modern class action lawsuits. Indeed, with a few 
exceptions, the use of these distribution schemes has actually continued 
to rise among federal courts. In order to fully capture this trend, this 
section lays out several updates to the data presented above and includes 
a few additional points regarding the use of this doctrine. The data 
presented in the chart below was compiled using Westlaw, Lexis Nexis, 
and Bloomberg Law. The original list was generated using Westlaw 
Litigation Analytics, where a search for ‘cy pres’ within class action 
cases revealed a comprehensive list of over 500 results. From that list, 
cases where cy pres distributions were only mentioned or otherwise 
denied were excluded. Pending cases were also excluded. 
  
 
43  Taking a standard deviation on either side of the average, considering the minimum 
cy pres award was $342. 
44  See infra Part II (b). 
45  Redish, Julian, & Zyontz, supra note 32. 
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This graph compares the recompiled data with the findings in Cy 
Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action.46 The recent 
searches produced a similar amount of cases for the time period between 
1991 and 2001. For the period between 2001 and 2008, however, the 
recently acquired data shows a significantly larger group of cases 
involving cy pres awards. This discrepancy could be explained by 
considering differences in the ways in which the data was initially 
gathered; however, the large proportion of unreported cases in the redone 
data could indicate that there are simply more slip opinions available 
online now than there were in 2008—and the rise of cy pres awards in 
class actions grew at an even faster rate than was previously thought. In 
either case, there was a clear rise in cy pres awards and settlements that 
accelerated at the turn of the millennium. 
46  Id. 
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This graph tracks the growth of cy pres distributions in class actions 
from 2003 to 2018. The data is presented as a line graph as opposed to a 
bar graph to better show the yearly trajectory of cy pres awards—
especially those coming from class action settlements.  This graph shows 
that cy pres distributions have continued to gain popularity in class 
action cases. It further shows that these distributions are happening in 
settlements more often than before; with 36 of the 37 class action cy pres 
awards coming from settlements in 2018. There have been a few notable 
drops in class action cy pres popularity, which seem to line up with 
instances where the Supreme Court of the United States has considered 
the issue.47 However, despite granting certiorari over one of these cases, 
the Court has failed to provide any adequate guidance for cy pres 
applicability in class action cases.48 So, unless the issue is addressed in 
the near future, federal courts will likely continue to apply the doctrine in 
future class action cases. 
47  See infra Part II (b). 
48  Id. 
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Like the table included in Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the 
Modern Class Action, this table was compiled with a smaller subset of 
cases from the initial search. Specifically, this table represents data from 
a sample of 50 cases that took place between 2011 and 2019 and had 
award breakdowns available. This data, however, does not measure cy 
pres distributions relative to total compensatory damages. Instead, it 
measures cy pres distributions against the total award or settlement 
amounts from the underlying class action lawsuits. As a comparison, the 
amount of compensation that went to unnamed class members was also 
presented against the total amounts in the same lawsuits. 
The data contained in this table shows that cy pres awards took an 
average of 11% from the total distributions in their respective sampled 
cases. The average dollar amount for these awards, however, was over 
$40 million. This shows that even low-percentage cy pres awards often 
amounted to large sums of money. The standard deviations of $167.6 
million further show that the figures in the sampled cases had a wide 
range—with 50% of cy pres awards sampled falling between $814 and 
$207.6 million. Additionally, the standard deviation of 27% indicates 
that half of the sampled cases involved cy pres awards that were between 
0.1% and 38% of the total distributions, with the remaining cases 
including even higher cy pres awards. Ultimately, the updated empirical 
data shows that class action cy pres awards continue to represent millions 
of dollars in distributions, and Federal Courts show no indication of 
abandoning the doctrine. 
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B.  Class Action Cy Pres in the Supreme Court 
i.  Frank v. Gaos 
Frank v. Gaos49 is the case that serves as the raison d’être for this 
note, and, at one time, it also seemed to be the Supreme Court’s chance 
to finally address the pathologies of class action cy pres distributions. 
Instead, the Court used a longtime favorite in its playbook for punting 
challenging decisions—it remanded the case on the question of Article 3 
standing.50 Frank v. Gaos began with a class action lawsuit against 
Google for their violation of consumer privacy laws—the In re Google 
Referrer Header Privacy Litigation.51 Specifically, the tech giant was 
accused of leaking consumer search terms by including those terms in 
“referrer headers,” which were subsequently disclosed to third parties.52 
Because of the sheer number of individuals that use Google for web 
searching, the class was estimated to include up to 129 million 
searchers.53 The case was settled for $8.5 million.54 From this settlement, 
the three class counsel received roughly $2.125 million, while the named 
class representatives go $5,000 each.55 Of the remaining $6 million in the 
settlement, the unnamed plaintiffs got nothing.56 Instead, that entire 
amount was devoted to a cy pres distribution scheme, which distributed 
the funds to a suspect group of charities.57 
One of the charities that received more of the settlement fund than 
any of the plaintiffs was the American Association of Retired Persons 
(AARP). The AARP has often promoted the defendant’s products,58 and 
consistently listed the defendant as one of its top five highest-paid 
independent contractors in its yearly filings.59 Several of the other 
 
49  Frank v. Gaos, 139 S.Ct. 1041, 1043-48 (2019). 
50  Id. at 1046 
51  In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litigation, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1122, 1126 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015) aff’d, 869 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041 
(2019). 
52  Id. at 1126-27. 
53  In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litigation, 869 F. 3d at 742. 
54  Id. at 740. 
55  Id. at 741. 
56  Id. at 741. 
57  Id. at 742. 
58  See e.g. Gary M. Kaye, Google—It Ain’t Just Search, AARP (June 11, 2013), 
https://www.aarp.org/home-family/personal-technology/info-06-2013/google-gmail-
news-weather-maps.html (promoting the use of Google services and products, including 
its search engine).  
59  See AARP, Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (Form 990) (2016) 
(indicating that AARP paid Google over $21 million in 2016). 
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charities that benefitted from the scheme were the law schools that class 
counsel had attended.60 This prompted the judge in the underlying 
litigation to refer to the cy pres award as a glorified alumni fundraiser.61 
Ultimately, upon hearing the challenges to the cy pres-only 
settlement that had been approved, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
And, although it appeared that the Supreme Court would finally address 
the permissibility of class action cy pres awards 62, the Court completely 
bypassed this important issue and remanded the case based on standing.  
Only Justice Thomas dissented, and explained that “[w]hatever role cy 
pres may permissibly play in disposing of unclaimed or distributable 
class funds, cy pres payments are not a form of relief to the absent class 
members and should not be treated as such (including when calculating 
attorney's fees). And the settlement agreement here provided no other 
form of meaningful relief to the class. This cy pres-only arrangement 
failed several requirements of Rule 23.”63 
In his dissent, Justice Thomas further explained that he would have 
decided the case on the merits, and that “because the class members here 
received no settlement fund, no meaningful injunctive relief, and no 
other benefit whatsoever in exchange for the settlement of their claims, 
[he] would hold that the class action should not have been certified, and 
the settlement should not have been approved.”64  
Justice Thomas’ views taken together with Chief Justice Roberts’ 
concerns65 over class action cy pres would seem to indicate that it is only 
a matter of time before an appropriate case comes to the Supreme Court 
that will allow it to address these distributions in class actions. Although 
that case should have been Frank v. Gaos, and it is easy to see how 
similar issues may prevent the Supreme Court from addressing class 
action cy pres in future cases, there is still hope that the Court will 
someday put an end to these unjustified redistributions of class funds. 
 
 
60  See In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litigation, 869 F.3d at 748  (Wallace, J., 
concurring in part) (explaining that the distributions to class counsels’ alma maters 
accounted for 47% of the overall settlement distribution); see also Brief for Petitioners, 
Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041 (2019) (No. 17-961), 2018 WL 3374998 at *32. 
61  Id. 
62  See Debra Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court to Consider Cy Pres Awards that Give no 
Money to Class-Action Plaintiffs, ABA JOURNAL (Apr. 30, 2018, 11:26 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/supreme_court_to_consider_cy_pres_awards_th
at_give_no_money_to_class_action.  
63  Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. at 1047 (Thomas, J. Dissenting) (internal citations 
omitted).  
64  Id. at 1048. 
65  See Marek v. Lane, 571 U.S. 1003, 1003 (2013). 
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ii.  Marek v. Lane 
The first time that class action cy pres distributions were discussed 
by the Supreme Court was in 2013, as it considered granting certiorari in 
the case of Marek v. Lane.66 The facts underlying Marek v. Lane include 
one of the more egregious examples of class action cy pres distributions. 
In the underlying lawsuit that prompted Marek v. Lane, Facebook settled 
a class action relating to consumer privacy.67 This multimillion dollar 
settlement did not include any compensation for unnamed class 
members.68 Instead, a majority of the settlement was diverted to a cy pres 
award, which was used to form a Private Foundation called the Digital 
Trust Foundation. The Digital Trust Foundation had three board 
members, and Facebook was allowed to hand-pick one of those board 
members.  
Cy pres distributions are often argued to be favorable over direct 
distributions because they are claimed to reduce administrative costs of 
issuing remedies. The Digital Trust Foundation shows that this argument 
is flawed because the cy pres recipient in that case spent hundreds of 
thousands of dollars on administrative costs and was still sitting on a 
large amount of the award years after the resolution of the case, 
according to the Foundations’ publicly filed tax forms. Although the 
Court did not ultimately grant certiorari in this case, Marek v. Lane 
corresponded with one of the few periods during which the use of class 
action cy pres awards actually fell out of favor.69 This is likely because 
Chief Justice Roberts was quite critical about these distributions when he 
issued a statement following the Court’s denial of certiorari: 
Marek's challenge is focused on the particular features of 
the specific cy pres settlement at issue. Granting review 
of this case might not have afforded the Court an 
opportunity to address more fundamental concerns 
surrounding the use of such remedies in class action 
litigation, including when, if ever, such relief should be 
 
66  571 U.S. 1003, 1003 (2013). 
67  Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that the action 
commenced after Facebook started using a program called Beacon to publicize users’ 
private information). 
68  Id. at 817. 
69  The comparable decline that occurred while Frank v. Gaos was being decided 
suggests that the aforementioned  decreases in the use of cy pres class awards  likely 
resulted from unease among federal courts; it is quite probable that they purposely 
elected to wait to hear what the Supreme Court of the United States had to say about class 
action cy pres awards. See infra Part II (A)(ii). 
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considered; how to assess its fairness as a general 
matter; whether new entities may be established as part 
of such relief; if not, how existing entities should be 
selected; what the respective roles of the judge and 
parties are in shaping a cy pres remedy; how closely the 
goals of any enlisted organization must correspond to the 
interests of the class; and so on. This Court has not 
previously addressed any of these issues. Cy pres 
remedies, however, are a growing feature of class action 
settlements. See Redish, Julian, & Zyontz, Cy Pres 
Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: 
A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 Fla. L.Rev. 
617, 653–656 (2010). In a suitable case, this Court may 
need to clarify the limits on the use of such remedies.70 
In issuing this statement, Chief Justice Roberts predicted that the 
Court will someday hear a case that will allow it to address the problems 
inherent in cy pres distributions in class actions. He also cited the only 
scholarly work that had adequately criticized the doctrine at the time, 
which has been summarized and updated in this article. Although the 
Court missed another opportunity to tackle this issue in Frank v. Gaos, it 
is still likely to come up in the near future given that the problem is still 
prevalent among Federal Courts. 
III. CY PRES BUT NO CIGAR: WHO REALLY BENEFITS FROM THE 
APPLICATION OF THIS DOCTRINE 
Critics of cy pres application in class actions have placed a heavy 
focus on the parties and judges involved in those suits. Their critiques are 
justified, and many are referenced in the earlier section of this note, but 
they do not pay enough attention to the ultimate recipients of these cy 
pres distributions: charities. This section will explore some of the major 
rules that govern charities in the United States, and argue that these rules 
do nothing towards achieving philanthropy, let alone the goals of cy pres 
in modern class actions. 
Charities in the United States are widely regarded as benevolent 
organizations that do good for their beneficiaries and the public at large. 
At best, this view is naïve. Although terms like “charity” and 
“philanthropy” have become interchangeable, the laws governing these 
 
70  Marek, 571 U.S. at 1003. 
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organizations do not define the term “philanthropy.”71 Instead, they 
describe different types of nonprofit organizations, and define their 
activities as charitable based on the absence of disqualifying elements 
instead of affirmative duties to do good or provide any measurable 
benefits to society.  
A. The Organization and Operation Tests 
 
Many of the fundamental requirements for public charities in the 
United States come from the “Organizational and Operational” tests laid 
out in the tax code and regulations.72 The organizational test is satisfied 
with the inclusion of “magic words” in the company’s articles of 
organization, which “(A) (a) Limit the purposes of such organization to 
one or more exempt purposes; and (b) Do not expressly empower the 
organization to engage, otherwise than as an insubstantial part of its 
activities, in activities which in themselves are not in furtherance of one 
or more exempt purposes.”73 These exempt purposes are wrapped up in a 
laundry list written into 501 (c)(3) by congress and expanded upon by the 
IRS in the treasury regulations.74  
A public charity’s exempt purpose can be extremely broad: articles 
of organization that say “this organization is formed for educational 
purposes within the meaning of section 501(c)(3) of the Code” would be 
sufficiently specific to satisfy the organizational test. 75 The exempt 
purpose can even be detached from any actual philanthropic activity 
because “articles stating that [an] organization is created solely to receive 
contributions and pay them over to organizations which are described in 
section 501(c)(3) and exempt from taxation under section 501(a)) are 
sufficient”76 for the organizational test. Conversely, the presence of a 
 
71  Ray D. Madoff, When is Philanthropy?: How the Tax Code’s Answer to This 
Question Has Given Rise to the Growth of Donor-Advised-Funds and Why It’s a 
Problem, in Philanthropy in Democratic Societies (Reich, Cordelli, & Bernholz 2016). 
72  See generally I.R.C. § 501(c)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (2017); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (2017). 
73 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (2017). 
74  Id. (This laundry list consists of various organizational purposes, including 
“charitable, religious, educational, scientific, literary, testing for public safety, fostering 
national or international amateur sports competition, and preventing cruelty to children or 
animals.”) 
75  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (2017). 
76  Id. 
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nonexempt purpose in an organization’s articles, if substantial77, outright 
prevents the organization from qualifying as a public charity “regardless 
of the number or importance of truly exempt purposes” that it carries 
on.78 This enables organizations to qualify as Public Charities under 
501(c)(3) without conducting any actual philanthropic activities 
whatsoever. Meanwhile, organizations that do nothing but conduct 
philanthropic activities can fail to qualify as 501(c)(3) because their 
articles enable activities outside of the congressionally-approved 
categories of charity, however desirable or publicly beneficial those 
activities may be.  
 An organization called Key Worldwide Foundation serves as a 
recent example of the latter type of organization. As a 501(c)(3), the 
exempt purpose for Key Worldwide Foundation was “to provide 
education that would normally be unattainable to underprivileged 
students, [to make it] not only attainable but realistic.”79 That purpose, 
which was “accomplished” through bribery and fraud, satisfied  the 
organizational test and allowed the company to operate as a 501(c)(3) 
unscrutinized for over 5 years.80 The organization would likely have 
remained a 501(c)(3) if its fraud had not been discovered in the course of 
a loosely related securities investigation.81 Indeed, this sham charity was 
 
77  There is some debate over what makes a nonexempt purpose in an organization’s 
articles substantial, thereby justifying removal of 501(c)(3) status. A thorough analysis of 
the question could be a note in and of itself. See e.g. American Institute for Economic 
Research v. U.S., 302 F.2d 934, cert. denied 372 U.S. 976, 976 (1962) (stripping an 
otherwise compliant educational organization of its 501(c)(3) status because it charged 
subscription fees for two periodical publications); but see Presbyterian and Reformed 
Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1984) (allowing a religious 
organization to keep its 501(c)(3) status while engaging in the business of buying and 
selling books for profit).  
78  See Better Bus. Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945); Redlands 
Surgical Servs. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 47, 71–72, 1999 WL 513862 (1999); 
Nationalist Movement v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 558, 576, 1994 WL 118959 (1994) 
(quoting Church in Boston v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 102, 107, 1978 WL 3388 (1978)), 
aff’d. 37 F.3d 216 (5th Cir.1994); American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, 92 
T.C. 1053, 1065, 1989 WL 49678 (1989). 
79  Alanna Richer, Parents Involved in College Admissions Scandal Could Face Tax 
Charges, Experts Say, TIME (April 2, 2019), http://time.com/5562642/parents-college-
admissions-scandal-additional-charges/. 
80  Id. 
81  Milton Valencia & Shelley Murphy, Here’s how Boston Investigators Uncovered 
What’s Being Called the Biggest College Bribery Scam in History, BOSTON GLOBE 
(March 13, 2019), https://www2.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/03/13/investigation-one-
scheme-lead-prosecutors-another/KBBjYqsgKeb8HQUs3yUkKP/story.html. (“It started, 
improbably, with a securities fraud investigation out of Boston, a so-called pump-and-
dump stock scam that extended overseas.”). 
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discovered largely by chance because the IRS looked no further than the 
magic words in the organization articles when granting 501(c)(3) status. 
 The main counterpart to the organization test in the law 
governing nonprofits is the operational test. The operational test is 
satisfied if the organization is “operated exclusively”82 for its exempt 
purpose, although the word exclusively is somewhat misleading because 
it does not mean “solely” or “without exception.” Instead, the meaning 
behind the word “exclusively” in the 501(c)(3) organization test has been 
heavily litigated and regulated since its drafting.83 Over time, this test has 
largely been whittled down to regulate certain categories of activity, 
rather than to ensure that charities are operated to do good. According to 
the operations test, charities should not participate in lobbying 
(insubstantial lobbying is allowed),84 provide improper private benefit 
(some personal benefit is allowed),85 inure benefit to insiders 
(competitive compensation is allowed),86 or conduct political activities 
(educational policy work is allowed).87 
 
 
82  Not to be confused with the prohibition against substantial nonexempt purposes in 
501(c)(3) organization articles. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (2017); see also supra 
note 81 and accompanying text. 
83  Again, a thorough exploration of this issue could be a full article in and of itself. 
But, for the purposes of this note, a few illustrative examples will do. See infra notes 84-
87. 
84  Nayantara Mehta, Nonprofits and Lobbying: Yes, They Can!, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION (Sept. 19, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2009/03/04_mehta/. 
Unfortunately, the IRS has not provided guidance on what is an 
appropriate "insubstantial" amount of lobbying and has not defined 
what exactly it considers to be lobbying under this test. Most tax 
practitioners believe that if a public charity's lobbying activity is less 
than 5 percent of its overall activities, it would be an insubstantial 
amount of lobbying.  
85  This rule has been used to challenge nonprofits that have individuals or small groups 
named as beneficiaries. However, there are exceptions for certain “needy” groups. 
Incidental private benefit to individuals is also allowed. See Frances Hill & Douglas 
Mancino, Operating for a Public Benefit: The Private Benefit Doctrines, Taxation of 
Exempt Organizations (2014). 
86  Nonprofit employees are often paid rates that are competitive with for-profit 
companies, and very generous—to encourage highly qualified individuals to work for 
employees. Id. 
87  See e.g. National Council of Nonprofits, Political Campaign Activities – Risks to 
Tax-Exempt Status, NCP, available at https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/tools-
resources/political-campaign-activities-risks-tax-exempt-status (last visited May 4, 2019) 
(providing a resource for nonprofits to act politically without losing their exempt status). 
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B. Bar on Commerciality 
Another avenue that is used to regulate charities is commerciality. 
Although participation in commercial activity does not indicate whether 
an organization is acting philanthropically, engagement in this type of 
activity can be sufficient to strip an organization of its status as a public 
charity. This removal of 501(c)(3) status happens even if the commercial 
activity is desirable or beneficial to the organization’s charitable 
purpose.88  This is because the rule against commerciality, like most 
rules governing charities, is designed to curtail abuses of the nonprofit 
business model rather than encouraging or enabling real philanthropy. 
Indeed, allowing more commercial activity among charities could 
actually be beneficial to further philanthropic goals in appropriate 
situations. This largely indiscriminate bar on commerciality could 
actually prevent a charity from helping more people or accomplishing the 
goals of a class action lawsuit in a cy pres distribution scheme. 
C. Accountability to Donors, and Cy Pres Schemes 
One common misconception about charities is that they are 
accountable to their donors or beneficiaries. Instead, charities are 
generally empowered to act contrary to the wishes of their donors—even 
if those donors only contributed for specific reasons that were later 
ignored. Red Cross serves as one example of this lack of accountability. 
Soon after the tragic events of September 11th, 2001, the Red Cross sent 
out calls for donations to provide relief to the people who had been 
impacted. Those calls were  well-received, and donors gave an estimated 
$2.7 billion to charities for relief related to the tragedy.89 The money sent 
to Red Cross for this reason, however, was largely diverted to be spent 
on other Red Cross projects, or squirreled away for years, benefitting no 
one.90 Additionally, the Red Cross was not required to refund the 
donations when that information came to light because donations are 
deemed to belong to charities in their full discretion once they pass into 
the charities’ possession. Although the Red Cross did ultimately offer to 
refund donations in that instance, this seemed to be a mere a public 
 
88  See e.g. Airlie Foundation v. Commissioner, 283 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C., 2003) 
(stripping a foundation of its nonprofit status because it occasionally managed a 
conference center as part of its operations). 
89  Robert Katz, A Pig in a Python: How the Charitable Response to September 11 
Overwhelmed the Law of Disaster Relief, 36 IND. L. REV. 251, 253-58 (2003). 
90  Davie Mikkelson, September 11 Monies, Are all the Monies Collected to Assist the 
Victims of the September 11 tragedy reaching their intended recipients?, SNOPES (Mar. 8, 
2008),  https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/charity-case/. 
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relations move–the Red Cross has continued to make calls for targeted 
donations, only to spend those donations elsewhere or not at all.91  
D. Under-Enforcement by the IRS and Challenges in 
Enforcement 
Although the laws governing nonprofits already do little to ensure 
that these organizations provide public benefit, they are also 
underenforced. This is because the IRS has insufficient resources to 
properly oversee this massive group of organizations, and there is little 
public pressure to ratchet up enforcement of existing rules. For example, 
the organizational test, which is not very challenging to satisfy, was not 
met by many organizations that, nevertheless, were allowed to keep their 
status as charities:  
Too frequently—between 26 and 42 percent of the 
time—the requirements for IRC (Section) 501(c)(3) 
status were not met and the IRS approval was erroneous. 
For example, as we reported in the 2017 Annual Report 
to Congress, one organization's articles of incorporation 
stated that its purpose was simply "establishment and 
operation of a farmer's market." In 2017, the IRS 
revoked the exempt status of at least two organizations 
that described themselves as farmers' markets, and in 
2017 and 2018 denied IRC (Section) 501(c)(3) status to 
at least two others. Those organizations, by providing a 
profitable outlet for local farmers and vendors, were 
primarily serving the private interests of those who came 
to the market to sell their products, as opposed to 
furthering an exempt purpose.92 
 So, to the extent that rules governing charities are actually 
beneficial, they still fall short of regulating the actions of charities. 
 
91  See e.g. Laura Sullivan, In Search of the Red Cross’ $500 Million in Haiti Relief, 
NPR (Jun. 3, 2015), https://www.npr.org/2015/06/03/411524156/in-search-of-the-red-
cross-500-million-in-haiti-relief.  
92  Taxpayer Advocate, Form 1023-EZ Now Elicits Additional Information, But It's Not 
Clear That IRS Reviewers Are Considering It, NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE (Oct. 24, 
2018), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/news/nta-blog-form-1023-ez-now-elicits-
additional-information-but-it-s-not-clear-that-irs-reviewers-are-considering-it. 
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IV. COME A LITTLE BIT CLOSER: ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO CY 
PRES PROBLEMS 
A. The “Lottery” Approach 
A possible alternative to cy pres distributions in class actions is a 
lottery approach. With this mechanism, unnamed class members would 
be given an opportunity to participate in a randomized drawing wherein a 
small number of them would be chosen to receive large distributions 
from the award or settlement. Insofar as lottery tickets themselves have 
value, this scheme would provide direct compensation to the unnamed 
class members.93 Admittedly, this style of distribution has never been 
attempted with class action funds, and a lottery approach in this context 
has been described as strange and even unsettling by some judges, who 
instead chose to apply equally strange cy pres distributions. When the 
concept of a lottery distribution was discussed in the Supreme Court, 
however, Justice Kavanaugh compared the approach to cy pres 
distributions and noted that neither approach seemed inherently stranger 
than the other for distributing class action funds.94  
B. Fluid Recovery 
One alternative method of relief to class action cy pres distributions 
that has actually been used by federal courts is fluid recovery. Although 
many courts have confused the two doctrines and referred to them as 
interchangeable, fluid recovery schemes generally provide much more 
meaningful benefit to the class members involved in the underlying 
lawsuits. This is because fluid recovery schemes are often clever ways 
for wrongdoing defendants to offer compensation to class members 
through their own future operations. Despite hesitation by some federal 
courts to apply this type of distribution, fluid recovery has been used by 
courts in every federal circuit, 95 particularly in class action settlement 
cases.96  
 
93  See e.g. EconMatters, How Much is a Lottery Ticket Worth, TALKMARKETS (Apr. 
15, 2018), https://talkmarkets.com/content/stocks--equities/how-much-is-a-lottery-ticket-
worth?post=172824; Walt Hickey, How to Calculate Your Expected Winnings On A 
Powerball Ticket, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 27, 2012), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/the-expected-value-of-playing-powerball-is-128-2012-
11. 
94  Oral Argument Transcript, Frank v. Gaos, No. 17-961 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Oct. 31, 2018). 
95  Id. citing Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp 278; Democratic Cent. Comm., 
84  F.3d 451; Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301 (9th 
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One recent example of a successful fluid recovery scheme, which 
was employed to prevent the award of a sizeable class action judgment, 
was Apple’s $29 iPhone battery replacement program. In 2017, reporters 
revealed that the company was intentionally slowing down older iPhone 
models because of issues related to those phones’ batteries.97 Consumers 
were enraged and did not hesitate to bring several class actions against 
Apple,98 which prompted the media giant to implement the battery 
program in January of 2018.99 Apple offered replacement batteries at 
reduced cost to people who owned older iPhone models.100 The program, 
which ended on December 31, 2018, was immensely popular. Indeed, 
Apple insiders reported that the company replaced 11 million phone 
batteries during the year-long offering. Any consumers who were harmed 
by Apple’s decision, to slow phones with older batteries, could have 
remedied their issues through the program. Although there are likely 
individuals who derived undue benefit from the program without 
suffering from the negative effects complained of initially,101 the 
program likely provided direct benefit to millions of prospective class 
members.  
There have been some effects on Apple in the aftermath of its battery 
replacement program that will likely affect the company’s ongoing 
 
Cir.1990); Nelson, 802 F.2d 405; American Int'l Pictures v. Price Enter., 636 F.2d 933 
(4th Cir.1980); L.C.L. Theatres v. Columbia Pictures, 421 F.Supp. 1090 (N.D.Tex.1976). 
96  (“[F]luid recovery has been accepted in some contexts by nearly all federal circuits 
that have considered it. It is most commonly employed by federal courts for damage 
distribution in settled cases”). Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 2005 WL 3032556 at 
*7 (E.D. N.Y.) citing Beecher, 575 F.2d 1010; Pfizer & Co., 314 F.Supp. 710; Jones v. 
National Distillers, 56 F.Supp.2d 355 (S.D.N.Y.1999); Agent Orange, 611 F.Supp. 1396; 
In re Mexico Money Transfer Litig., 267 F.3d 743 (7th Cir.2001); Powell v. Georgia–
Pacific Corp., 119 F.3d 703 (8th Cir.1997); In re Motorsports Merch. Antitrust Litig., 
160 F.Supp.2d 1392 (N.D.Ga.2001); Colson v. Hilton Hotels Co., 59 F.R.D. 324 
(N.D.Ill.1972).   
97  Fionna Agomuoh, Batterygate: How Apple Secretly Slowed Down Older iPhones 
and why it’s such a Big Deal, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/apple-batterygate-how-older-iphones-slowed-down-
and-why-its-a-big-deal-2017-12. 
98  See In re Apple Inc. Device Performance Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 3d 434, 440-450 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2018).  
99  Dave Smith, If you own an iPhone 6 of Later that isn’t Holding its Charge, now is 
the Time to get your Battery Replaced, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 30, 2018), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/apple-iphone-battery-replacement-program-december-
2018-9. 
100  Id. 
101  For example, anyone who purchased one of the affected phone models to take 
advantage of the program after it was announced.  
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practices. First, the program was more popular than the company had 
foreseen. This forced Apple to sell more batteries than it had anticipated 
at a reduced price, or below market rate, which in turn reduced the 
profits that they would have otherwise received from their ordinary 
battery replacements that are much more expensive.102 The availability 
of cheap battery replacements also reduced the demand for Apple’s new 
iPhone models, since consumers were inclined to keep their older 
iPhones for longer than usual after receiving new batteries.103 This 
caused Apple’s stock price to fall dramatically,104 and prompted 
securities lawsuits against the company.105 Ultimately, this financial 
nightmare will likely have a significant deterrent effect on Apple, 
discouraging any similar programs in the future. 
C. Helicopter Drop 
One additional alternative to class action cy pres distributions that is 
far more likely to accomplish the goals of class action lawsuits is a 
mechanism known as a “helicopter drop.”106 A literal helicopter drop 
would entail loading class action funds in the form of cash onto a plane 
or helicopter,  and releasing those funds over highly-populated areas. 
Unlike cy pres distributions, a helicopter drop could feasibly provide 
some direct benefit to unnamed class members.107 A figurative helicopter 
 
102  See Smith supra, note dd. (The ordinary price for battery replacements was $79). 
103  Dave Smith, Apple is Partially Blaming Weak iPhone Sales on Customers Taking 
Advantage of the $30 Battery-Replacement Offer, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 2, 2019), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/apple-blames-weak-iphone-sales-partly-on-battery-
replacement-offer-2019-1. 
104  Evan Niu, Here’s How Much Apple’s Battery-Replacement Program Hurt Sales, 
MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.fool.com/investing/2019/01/15/heres-how-
much-apples-battery-replacement-program.aspx (Apple CEO reportedly attributed $7.2 
billion in missed revenue, and the corresponding stock dip, to the popularity of the 
battery replacement program).  
105  Kif Leswing, Apple is Squirreling Away Money to Pay for Lawsuits Related to its 
iPhone ‘batterygate’ Throttling Scandal, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 4, 2019), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/iphone-batterygate-lawsuits-cause-apple-to-set-aside-
money-2019-2. 
106  Neil Irwin, Helicopter Money: Why Some Economists Are Talking About Dropping 
Money From the Sky, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2016), 
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drop – the kind actually contemplated under the doctrine–could work in 
the following way: 
First, unclaimed or undistributed funds that would have gone to a cy 
pres fund would instead escheat to the state under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2041, 
2042. This statute says that “all moneys paid into any court of the United 
States . . . in any case pending of adjudicated in such court, shall be 
forthwith deposited with the Treasurer of the United States, in the name 
and to the credit of such court” , and that such money “so deposited for at 
least five years unclaimed by the person entitled thereto [shall be] 
deposited in the Treasury in the name and to the credit of the United 
States.”108 Next, the Tax Code would be amended to provide a variable 
refundable tax credit for anyone who was an unnamed member of a class 
in a class action, as determined by a yearly list published by the IRS to 
be used by tax preparers. In doing so, the administration costs and 
enforcement mechanism for fraud would be shared with an agency that 
specializes in making individual determinations over the entire tax base 
of the United States.  This would allow unnamed class members a better 
chance at accessing the compensation that was diverted away from them.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Class action cy pres awards are often gross miscarriages of justice, 
yet they have become incredibly popular means for redistributing class 
action funds. This popularity has risen despite the requirements of Rule 
23 and the lack of compatibility of this doctrine with the fundamental 
goals of class action lawsuits. Hopefully, the Supreme Court is able to 
take a case to address the lack of compatibility and finally curtail the use 
of class action cy pres. When the Court does take such a case, it should 
have in its arsenal all the alternatives to cy pres distributions that come 
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